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May. 9th, 2010 12:44 amВот чувак очень просто и точно выражает суть Европейского Фин. Кризиса
Indeed, the problem with European leaders' response to this crisis has been that their exaggerated concerns about appearances have led them to reject useful strategies.
и еще очень важное
It is now with the same misguided determination that some European officials have tried to shut down any discussion of a restructuring of Greece's debt, or that of any other eurozone country, on the theory that a default for one would be a default for them all.
In fact, markets are fully capable of distinguishing between the finances of different countries that may use the same currency, just as they can distinguish the bonds of the state of California from those of Utah.
и еще
With the Greek credit crisis quickly turning into a eurozone-wide liquidity crisis, European leaders would be well advised to forget about appearances and come up with an acceptable mechanism for the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. For just as "too big to fail" has proven a lousy strategy for banks, it is just as lousy when applied to countries, in both cases encouraging incaution on the part of lenders and profligacy and risk-taking on the part of borrowers. While a debt restructuring would be painful for Greece and its European bankers, it would surely be less painful than a decade of austerity-induced recession. And while a Greek default would probably lead to higher borrowing costs for some eurozone neighbors, that's precisely the sort of post-bubble repricing of risk that is necessary to restore confidence in global markets, rebalance the global economy and provide the foundation necessary for sustainable long-term growth.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050405128.html
Indeed, the problem with European leaders' response to this crisis has been that their exaggerated concerns about appearances have led them to reject useful strategies.
и еще очень важное
It is now with the same misguided determination that some European officials have tried to shut down any discussion of a restructuring of Greece's debt, or that of any other eurozone country, on the theory that a default for one would be a default for them all.
In fact, markets are fully capable of distinguishing between the finances of different countries that may use the same currency, just as they can distinguish the bonds of the state of California from those of Utah.
и еще
With the Greek credit crisis quickly turning into a eurozone-wide liquidity crisis, European leaders would be well advised to forget about appearances and come up with an acceptable mechanism for the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt. For just as "too big to fail" has proven a lousy strategy for banks, it is just as lousy when applied to countries, in both cases encouraging incaution on the part of lenders and profligacy and risk-taking on the part of borrowers. While a debt restructuring would be painful for Greece and its European bankers, it would surely be less painful than a decade of austerity-induced recession. And while a Greek default would probably lead to higher borrowing costs for some eurozone neighbors, that's precisely the sort of post-bubble repricing of risk that is necessary to restore confidence in global markets, rebalance the global economy and provide the foundation necessary for sustainable long-term growth.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050405128.html
